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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 1995, President Clinton issued a "Statement with
Congressional Leaders on Financial Assistance to Mexico," stating that
because of "emergency circumstances" in Mexico he intended to rely on the
Exchange Stabilization Fund' to provide billions of dollars in financial
assistance to Mexico.2 The question of whether the President, acting within
the authority of the Executive branch, has the power to act unilaterally in
certain foreign affairs or whether he is required to seek authorization from
Congress has often been debated by scholars and the Supreme Court alike.3
* J.D., University of Georgia, 1996; B.A., University of Georgia, 1991. Special thanks
to Professor Harold G. Maier, Vanderbilt University School of Law, who provided tremendous
advice, support, and suggestions regarding this paper topic during his visiting term at The
University of Georgia in 1995, and who was the initial motivation for my pursuing this
research. Thanks also for the administrative support of Karen Davis, and for her many hours
spent on attention to every detail. Finally, thanks to my parents, Mark and Gail Chapman,
for encouraging me to achieve all of my goals.
'See 31 U.S.C. § 5302 (1994) [hereinafter Exchange Stabilization Fund].
: See "President's Statement with Congressional Leaders on Financial Assistance to
Mexico," 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC. 155 (Jan. 31, 1995), cited in 105 YALE L.J. 1311,
1312 n.9 (1996).
' Although the Constitution does not specifically provide for the "separation of powers"
between the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of government, in effect it creates
this structure by conferring exclusive and explicit powers on each branch in Articles I, 11, and
III respectively. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerated powers of Legislative branch are
to borrow money, regulate commerce, coin money, regulate value of U.S. and foreign coin,
establish commerce, raise and support armies, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
implied powers are to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the
enumerated powers); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (President is only source of
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While the Supreme Court has historically recognized the need for the
President to act alone in many situations involving foreign affairs, the Court
has also expressed the need to limit the President's power as well.4 This
issue has become even more complex in recent history, as Presidents have
frequently acted unilaterally, claiming legislative authority when, in fact, the
legislation relied upon was intended by Congress to be used for an entirely
different purpose.5 As the Constitution does not specifically define the
powers that it confers upon each branch of government, differences in
interpretation create conflict, especially between the Executive and Legisla-
tive branches in the area of foreign affairs.6 The Judicial branch is often
Constitutional executive power and has power to enforce domestic laws made by Congress);
see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (general enumerated powers of Executive include power to
execute laws, make treaties, act as Commander-in-Chief, veto, pardon, suppress rebellions,
and repel invasions); see also U.S. CONST. art. l, § 1 (judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court.).
" See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (it is necessary that the
President be allotted discretion to act in foreign affairs so that he may act quickly in
emergencies); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (President's
decision to suspend pending court claims without express Constitutional or Congressional
authority is allowed where there is "systematic, unbroken, executive practice" known by
Congress and never questioned); but see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952) (President's conduct unauthorized where no authorization from either Constitution
or Congress exists.).
The most recent example, and the subject of this Note, is President Clinton's reliance
on the Exchange Stabilization Fund (which was intended for use in stabilizing the United
States currency in economic emergencies), to provide more than $20 billion in loans to
Mexico. See Exchange Stabilization Fund, supra note 1; see also Protocol of Provisional
Application, 61 Stat., pt. 6 at A2051 (1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950) within Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act, 59 Stat. 410 (1945) (Truman relied on this legislation which was intended
to allow the U.S. to enter bilateral trade agreements, but which Truman used to enter
multilateral GAlT Agreement); see also War and National Defense, Trading with the Enemy
Act of 1917, Ch. 106, at 5(b), 40 Stat. 411 (1917), current version at 12 U.S.C.S. Appx. §
5(b) (1994) (Roosevelt relied on this statute during the Great Depression to freeze all national
banks in 1933 while the statute was intended to be used only in emergencies related to foreign
affairs). Each of these acts is arguably a questionable use by the President of the legislation
involved in a manner not intended by Congress.
6 The general purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is to create a system of checks
and balances as safeguards against the abuse of power by any one branch of government. See
Bruce Stein, Note, Presidential Foreign Policy Power (Part I): The Framers' Intent and the
Early Years of the Republic, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 425 (1983); see also id. at 425
("Others [at the Constitutional Convention] were just as fearful of legislative tyranny.").
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called upon to resolve these power struggles.7 The framers of the Constitu-
tion instituted this separation of powers framework in order to restrain the
constant propensity of any one branch of government to enlarge its
boundaries. 8 "The delegates at the Convention, in developing the Constitu-
tion, acted with an acute awareness of the great risks to liberty posed by a
too powerful Executive." 9  Despite this Constitutional mandate, the
Executive branch in recent years has accumulated powers in the area of
foreign affairs that defies our founding fathers' intent and threatens to
destroy the foundation upon which our government's decision-making
process is based. This paper will provide a brief background discussion of
the separation of powers doctrine, including the emergence of executive
authority in foreign affairs, and the legislative checks and balances designed
to limit that authority as expressed in three historical Supreme Court
decisions.10 This paper will then discuss the constitutionality of President
Clinton's recent loan initiative to Mexico in the context of several other
cases where a President, acting on the premise of Congressional authority,
used legislation for a purpose different from that which Congress had
intended, and the acts were subsequently upheld as constitutional solely due
to the passage of time.
7 The Supreme Court has the duty to "say what the law is," (see Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); however, the Court may refuse to decide a particular case
if it deems the issue to be a "political question" which is explicitly delegated to another
branch of government. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). Also, when forced to
rule on a Constitutional issue, the Court will do so using a "narrow scope of judicial
function." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594.
' See Stein, supra note 6, at 423. Before the debates at the Constitutional Convention
took place, "Americans believed that the Executive presented the greatest danger to the
Union" as is evidenced by the subordinate role given to the Executive branch in eight state
Constitutions between 1776 and 1778. See id. (citing A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND CONsTIuTTIoNAL PowER: THE ORIGINS 426 (1976)) ("The instructions of the town of
Boston to its representatives in the General Court in May, 1776, expressed the view that it
was 'essential to liberty' that the three powers should be 'as nearly as possible, independent
of and separate from each other.' ").
" See Stein, supra note 6, at 426 (Madison "felt that a concentration of powers in the
same hands 'may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny' " (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961))); see also id. at 426 (John
Jay believed it prudent to keep functions of the three branches separate, as numerous
examples existed where governments in which the power was held by one body later plunged
into tyrannies).
'0 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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II. HISTORIcAL BACKGROUND
In December, 1994, Mexico stunned global financial markets by devaluing
the peso." Prior to this devaluation, several events occurred which should
have provided a warning to foreign investors that the peso was over-valued;
however, foreign financiers continued to make large investments in Mexico,
causing greater reliance by the Mexican government on these funds, which
ultimately led to a more devastating crisis in 1994.2 American investors
owned about sixty percent of the short-term bonds in Mexico, known as
tesbonos, which became a large source of financing for the Mexican
government during Carlos Salinas' Presidency.' 3 Thus, Americans would
" See Jeff A. Schnepper, Mexico is Draining the U.S. Treasury, USA TODAY (Magazine),
May, 1995, at 15; see also Vince Golle, Mexico: Good Politics or Prudent Policy?,
FUTURES, April, 1995, at 68 (ongoing liquidity problems in Mexico depressed the peso with
likelihood of problems spreading to other markets).
"Prior to the devaluation in December, 1994, the inflation picture looked somewhat
promising" as the government was planning more privatization of industry, former President
Salinas was making Mexico more attractive to foreign investment, and the North American
Free Trade Agreement was passed. See David E. McClean, Mixing Apples and Oranges in
Mexico, THE ETHNIC NEWSWATCH, National Minority Politics, Apr. 30, 1995.
12 See McClean, supra note 11, at 2 (devaluation of peso was caused by everything from
"assassinations to a too-high current accounts deficit").
When Carlos Salinas de Gortari was President, he attempted to help Mexico out of poverty
by tying the Mexican peso to the United States dollar which increased foreign investment
initially. However, those investments decreased after the passage of NAFTA, which caused
Mexico's foreign exchange reserve to plummet as investors flocked to the U.S. market and
its higher interest rates. See Jeff Schnepper, supra note 11, at 5. Finally, the December 1,
1994, announcement of the devaluation caused the peso to drop seventy percent and foreign
investors began to dump their stocks and bonds, leaving the Mexican government with the
real likelihood of defaulting on foreign bondholders. See id.; see also Golle, supra note 11
("Throughout 1994, the peso was pressured as foreign capital outflows increased. Rebellion
in the Mexican state of Chiapas only exacerbated the amount of foreign capital leaving
Mexico."); see also Recession in Mexico Called Likely if Rescue Plan Fails, WASH. POST,
Jan. 31, 1995, at D1 (reasons for collapse of peso include swollen trade deficit, excess of
short-term borrowing from investors, and a "dearth of hard currency"); see also Ewell E.
Murphy, Jr., Making the Most of NAFTA, MEXICO TRADE AND LAW REPORTER, June 1, 1995,
Vol. 5, No. 6, p. 15 ("The Achilles' heel of Mexico's trade deficit was excessive reliance on
speculative capital to finance the deficit.").
"3 See Nancy Nusser, Mexican Protestors Fault U.S. Aid Plan, HoUs. CHRON., Jan. 29,
1992, at 1; see also Jeff Schnepper, supra note 11, at 15.
The Mexican government had hoped to pay back holders of tesbonos and other short-term
loans by selling new bonds with longer maturities, but with the devaluation of the peso and
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have been among the biggest losers had the Mexican government defaulted
on these debts, and this was a key consideration in President Clinton's
decision to attempt to "bail out" the Mexican government.'4 President
Clinton first sought Congressional approval for $40 billion in United States
loan guarantees to be joined with several billion dollars from the Internation-
al Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlement. While no
formal vote was taken, Congress made it clear to the President that it would
refuse to provide him with the requisite approval for such appropriations. 5
President Clinton then decided to take unilateral action and make approxi-
mately $20 billion in actual loans to Mexico taken from the United States
treasury through the Exchange Stabilization Fund which was established in
the 1930s to defend the value of the dollar in economic crises. 6 Clinton's
use of this fund was questioned immediately by Congress and members of
the public; government officials even commented publicly that a plan to use
the likelihood that the Mexican government might default on these short-term debts, foreign
investors became very reluctant to buy the new, long-term bonds, generating the economic
crisis. See Recession in Mexico Called Likely If Rescue Plan Fails, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
1995, at D1.
14 See Schnepper, supra note 11, at 16 ("Clinton's plan will protect the holders of short-
term bonds and reward Wall Street banks that underwrite loans."); see also Nancy Nusser,
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 29, 1995, at 1 (Mexico needs bailout because it may not have cash to
pay $26.5 billion in tesbonos bonds, sixty percent of which are held by Americans); see also
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1995, at D2 ("Without U.S. backing, Mexican government would have
no ready means of repaying holders of almost $28 billion in short-term bonds that come due
this year.").
5 See MExICO TRADE AND LAW JOURNAL, June 1, 1995, at 16 (citing Keith M.
Rockwell, Still Far Too Much Politicizing of Mexico Bailout, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 26, 1995,
at 25A ("As the market railed, lawmakers dithered, investor panic spread and Congress passed
the buck to the White House.")); see also Dean Foust et al., Anatomy of a Rescue Mission,
Bus. WK., Feb. 13, 1995, at 32 (with Clinton's controversial loan guarantee plan dead on
Capitol Hill, top Administrative officials "labored through the night to craft an alternative
plan.").
16 See Text of President Clinton's Letter to Congress on Economic Crisis in Mexico, U.S.
NEwSwIRE, Mar. 10, 1995, (on January 31, 1995, President Clinton decided to provide direct
loans and credits to Mexico pursuant to the Exchange Stabilization Fund, 31 U.S.C. Sec.
5302(b)); see also Bruce Stokes, Tottering Markets, THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, Feb. 18, 1995,
Vol. 27, No. 7, at 2 ("Stalemated by Congressional opposition to a package of $40 billion in
loan guarantees to Mexico, President Clinton crafted a Mexican bailout package on his own
authority.").
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the Exchange Stabilization Fund in such a manner would be unauthorized. 7
It is this type of unilateral decision making by the Executive branch which
threatens the continued existence of the separation of powers doctrine and
the ability of the Legislative branch to participate in future foreign affairs
matters. President Clinton's reinterpretation of the Exchange Stabilization
Fund legislation clearly thwarts Congress' purpose in passing the statute (as
the statute purports on its face to exist in order to defend the value of the
U.S. dollar).18 Furthermore, it is directly contrary to Congressional will on
the issue of loaning money to Mexico, since Congress would have voted to
prevent such conduct.' 9 The effect of the President's action is even broader
than its immediate economic consequences because the Supreme Court has
demonstrated a willingness to accept such Presidential action as constitution-
ally valid in the face of Congressional silence (i.e., failure of Congress to
bring suit against President).20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
The concept of separation of governmental powers is derived from the
U.S. Constitution as it enumerates specific and exclusive powers for each
branch of government. 1 This explicit allocation of powers has been
interpreted as the Framers' intent to provide for a system of "checks and
balances" among the three branches, so that no one branch would be able to
abuse its power at the expense of another branch, or more importantly, to the
detriment of the American people.2
While the Framers of the Constitution "did not make the judiciary the
overseer of our government,, 23 the Supreme Court is often called upon to
17 See Dean Foust et al., The Mexican Crisis, Bus. WK., Feb. 13, 1995, at 32 ("Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan told a Senate committee on January 26, 1995, that the
[Federal Reserve Board] and [the] Treasury lack[ed] authority 'as we see it to take that sort
of action.' ").
"S See supra note 14.
19 Id.
20 See infra notes 54 and 73.
21 See sources cited supra at note 4.
2 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The accretion of
dangerous power does not come in a day, [it comes], however slowly, from the generative
force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested
assertion of authority.").
2 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594.
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interpret the Constitution, and must often attempt to define clearly the
powers of the coordinate branches of government.2 One issue which the
Court has often been forced to decide is whether the President may act
unilaterally and by-pass Congress in order to act in the immediate interests
of the United States in a national emergency or in foreign affairs.'
The express powers of the President are enumerated in Article II, sections
2 and 3 of the Constitution; 6 however, the Supreme Court has on several
occasions ruled that the President derives implied powers not specifically
listed in the Constitution from the broad grant of all "executive powers" in
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, and from "inherent" powers
necessary to act in foreign affairs and national emergencies. 27 It is often
argued that it is necessary that the President be allowed to act alone in many
areas concerning foreign policy so that he may act quickly in the face of a
national emergency;" the Supreme Court has recognized this broad,
' See supra note 5; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (it
is the duty of the Court to "say what the law is"). The Court may refuse to rule on a
particular case if it deems the issue to be a "political question" which is explicitly delegated
to another branch of government. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Also, the Court,
when forced to rule on a Constitutional issue, will do so using a "narrow scope of the judicial
function." See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594.
25 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2 and 3: "The President shall be the Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States ... He shall
have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties ...
[H]e shall nominate, and.., appoint Ambassadors ... and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for .. "
27 "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (President has power which
does not require an act of Congress as the basis of its exercise, but which is a "plenary and
exclusive power of the President as sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations."); see also Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 637 (when there is "no contrary indication of legislative intent and ... [when]
there is a history of congressional acquiescence" the President may be said to have broad
discretion to act "on independent Presidential responsibility.")).
' See Elliot E. Cheatham and Harold G. Maier, Private International Law and Its
Sources, 22 VAND. L. REV. 27, 69 (1968) ("Burdened with international responsibility, the
executive must have whatever ... power he needs ... to effectively support his activities in
[foreign affairs]."); see also Harold G. Maier, Immigration Emergency Powers: Legislative
and Executive Interaction and Refugee Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1982) (citing A. Miller, Presidential Power (1977) at 205, 233-28
("The President has power to act in emergency situations, at least as long as he does not
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discretionary power in a line of cases beginning with United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.29
In Curtiss-Wright, certain defendants were indicted for conspiring in the
United States to sell arms to Bolivia in violation of a Presidential Proclama-
tion issued pursuant to authority conferred upon the President by a
Congressional Joint Resolution.3 The Court was called upon to determine
whether the Joint Resolution was, in fact, an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the President. In ruling against the defendant arms
dealers, the Curtiss-Wright Court held that the President's act and the Joint
Resolution were each examples of constitutionally authorized conduct.31
The Court suggested that the President could act even without express
legislative authority because the federal government, upon its formation, was
vested with certain powers which were not dependent upon the Constitution,
but rather were passed from the British Crown to the federal government by
the Declaration of Independence as "necessary concomitants of nationali-
ty.
'32
According to the Court, the powers to "wage war, to conclude peace, to
make treaties and to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties"
are special powers inherent to the United States as a sovereign, and certain
of these inherent powers are given to the Executive branch regarding foreign
affairs.33 Although not enumerated in the Constitution, these inherent
powers are necessary, the Court reasoned, because the President is the "sole
organ of the nation in its external relations.34
While Justice Sutherland was suspicious that the federal government
inherited certain foreign affairs powers by the mere nature of sovereignty, he
did assume that the Executive branch should be the exclusive means of
executing these powers, should they exist.35 However, since the Constitu-
tion actually delegates certain exclusive, foreign affairs powers to both the
Legislative and Executive branches, it is by no means clear which branch of




29 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
30 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311-12.
31 id.
32 Id. at 318.
33 Id. at 318-20.
34 Id. at 319.
35 Id.
3 See supra note 4.
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Nevertheless, the result of the Curtiss-Wright decision gave the President
essentially unfettered discretion concerning foreign relations by virtue of this
inherent executive power. The Court also suggested that because Congress
had enacted vaguely similar legislation in the past, this presented proof of
implied Congressional authorization for the President's present action.37
This argument (that silent acquiescence by Congress denotes Presidential acts
as constitutional) was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore
v. Regan3 fifty years later, and may, in fact, be the justification for most
unilateral acts by a President being deemed constitutional thereafter.
Several Court decisions subsequent to Curtiss-Wright seem to have
rejected Sutherland's analysis regarding Presidential power in favor of more
limiting language.39
In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,' the President acted
unilaterally in authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the majority
of the steel mills in the United States in order to prevent them from shutting
down due to a labor strike.41  The President claimed that a national
emergency existed and that a strike would jeopardize the national defense
during the Korean War.42
The President claimed to have acted based on his constitutional powers as
"Commander-in-Chief" and on the power conferred on him by the Legisla-
ture in the Defense Production Act of 1950.4' The Court rejected this
argument, however, and found the President's acts unconstitutional,
reasoning that his power to act must derive from either an express grant in
the Constitution or from an act of Congress, and that neither existed to
provide the President with the authority to seize private property in the
37 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 328.
38 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
39 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585: "The
President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from
the Constitution itself."); see also David S. Eggert, Executive Order 12, 333: An Assessment
of the Validity of Warrantless National Security Systems, 1983 DuKE L. J. 611, 614 (quoting
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 630-33 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J., dissenting),
regarding Sutherland's argument in Youngstown: "[I]t is one thing to say that the federal
government succeeded to the foreign affairs prerogatives of George III. It is another to say
that those prerogatives have passed from George III to George Washington and in unbroken
succession to Richard Nixon.").
4 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
4' 343 U.S. at 582-84.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 582, 604.
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United States." The Court stated that no powers under the Constitution's
"Commander-in-Chief" allocation had been invoked, and that not only did
no Congressional authority exist, but Congress had instead passed contrary
legislation intended to prevent precisely this type of act. 5
Justice Black stated in his majority opinion that the President's "Com-
mander-in-Chief" power did not apply because the act of seizing mills was
"too far removed from the theater of war" to invoke this Constitutional
power.' This reasoning serves to distinguish Youngstown from Curtiss-
Wright in that the seizure of domestic steel mills was too far removed from
"foreign affairs" to warrant the President's exercise of sole discretion absent
Congressional authority, especially since the President's power, while
concededly greater in an "emergency," certainly does not extend so broadly
in the face of a contrary intent by Congress.47
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson stated that "presidential powers
are not fixed but fluctuate," depending upon their disjunction or conjunction
with those of Congress.48 In Youngstown, Justice Jackson divided presiden-
tial powers into three classes: (1) the President's authority is at its maximum
when he acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress;
if an act is deemed unconstitutional here it usually means that the Federal
Government lacks the authority to act in this area; (2) when the President
acts in the absence of either a Congressional grant or denial of authority the
President can rely on his own independent powers; (3) when the President
acts incompatibly with an express or implied will of Congress his power is
at a minimum; the President's acts here can only be sustained by disabling
44 Id. at 585.
41 Id. at 585.
4 "Id. at 587.
47 Id. at 585. The Court refused to do here what it did in Curtiss-Wright when it granted
the President broad discretion to act based on his inherent powers. Rather, the Court chose
to limit the President's authority to act to only those situations expressly authorized by the
Constitution or those in which Congress expressly grants the President authority. Perhaps the
Court silently determined that while seizing mills may have had an effect on foreign affairs,
the actual result of seizing property within the U.S. fell into a situation which the Court
refused to address in Curtiss-Wright; namely, whether the President's conduct in a similar
situation (but related only to internal affairs) would be constitutional. If such is the case, the
Court in Youngstown impliedly determined that such conduct is unconstitutional.
4' Id. at 635.
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Congress from acting on the subject.49 The only way the Court could have
upheld the President's act, according to Justice Jackson, would have been to
hold that such a seizure was solely within the President's domain and beyond
the control of Congress, which clearly would have been erroneous.'
Thus, the Court stated that the President's acts were unconstitutional as
contrary to the will of Congress, and were beyond his executive power as
they were essentially attempts to legislate which is a power granted
exclusively to the Congress in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution." The
Court in Youngstown furthermore refused to recognize or allow the President
discretion to act in an "emergency," stating that while Congress may grant
the President latitude to act in such a situation, the President must first go
to Congress and seek authorization.52
The concurring opinions of Justice Burton and Justice Clark are interest-
ing, practical assessments of the constitutionality of presidential conduct.
While Justice Burton emphasized that the President relied upon Congressio-
nal legislation that did not provide for seizure,53 he also suggested that had
the President relied upon other legislation which provided for seizure (such
as § 18 of the Selective Service Act of 1948 which authorized the President
to seize plants failing to fill certain defense orders), he could have followed
the applicable procedures and seized the mills with the full authority of
Congress, thus rendering his acts constitutional.'
Justice Clark, on the other hand, noted that had Congress subsequently
ratified the President's acts, this would imply Congressional authority and
' Id. at 601-03 (regarding Labor Management Act of 1947 dealing with "national
emergencies" arising out of a breakdown in peaceful, industrial relations; Congress chose not
to lodge [seizure] power with the President, but rather expressly required the President to
report to Congress). See also David S. Eggert, supra note 22, 1983 DUKE L. J. 611, 635-36
(citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38). In Youngstown, the President's acts were
undertaken with the least amount of authority because Congress had already expressed a
contrary intent regarding the President's ability to seize property in the event of labor
negotiations.
50 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640.
s Id.
52 Id. at 652 (citing 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 348 (Congress may expand normal executive
powers to meet an emergency during war)).
3 Id. at 658 (Defense Production Act of 1950 provided for negotiations by the President
between the parties, but no seizure. However, when negotiations failed here, the President
seized the mills contrary to his authority).
5' Id. at 659 (citing Selective Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App. § 468 (1948)).
19961
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thus no adjudication would have been necessary. 5 Similarly, Justice
Frankiurter suggested that had Congress merely acquiesced to similar acts
over an extended period of time, the President may have relied on this
silence as authorization as well.56
Thus, while at first glance the Youngstown Court seemed to limit the
powers of the President to act unilaterally (as compared to the Curtiss-Wright
decision), the Court actually enforced the principals behind that case. The
issue the Court faced in Youngstown was not directly concerning foreign
affairs, and the dictum in Youngstown suggests (as does Curtiss-Wright) that
in practice acquiescence by Congress (including long-standing silence)
creates constitutional power in the Executive to act alone. This principle
became a key element in the Court's 1981 decision in Dames & Moore v.
Regan.
57
In Dames & Moore President Carter, acting under the legislative authority
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 58 declared
a national emergency and blocked the removal or transfer of all seized
property owned by the Iranian government in response to American citizens
being held hostage.59 The President subsequently negotiated an agreement
with the government of Iran to nullify any attachments on Iranian property
in the United States and to dismiss all pending claims in the United States
against the Iranian government in exchange for the hostages' release. 60
The plaintiffs in Dames & Moore had outstanding attachments and
pending suits against the Iranian government, and sued the Secretary of the
Treasury in the United States for implementing the Presidential agreement,
claiming that it was unconstitutional and beyond the President's executive
powers.6' Two issues were presented to the Court: The first was whether
5 Id. at 661.
' Id. at 610-11. In concurring, Justice Frankfurter discussed a "gloss of life method" of
interpreting the powers of each branch of government providing that: "a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned, ... making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive power.' " Since only three isolated
instances of prior Presidential seizures existed in Youngstown, no continued acquiescence
existed.
57 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
m 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1978).
59 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662-63.
60 Id. at 664-65.
61 Id. at 666-67.
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the President had the power to nullify all attachments of Iranian property,
and the second was whether the President had the power to suspend current
claims pending in the United States courts against the Iranian government.
62
The Dames & Moore Court borrowed language previously used in
Youngstown regarding sources of Presidential power, stating that express
authorizations from either the Constitution or from Congress were required
in order for the President to act.63 The Court ultimately ruled that the
President's reliance on § 1702 of IEEPA provided "sweeping and unquali-
fied" authorization to vacate the attachments.
64
Although the Appellants in Dames & Moore raised a key issue central to
several recent cases (namely that the legislation relied upon by the President
was not intended to be used in such a way as to give the President such
great authority), the Court rejected this argument and stated that the
legislative history regarding the IEEPA statute and court cases interpreting
it gave the President broad authority under the statute to vacate attachments
during an emergency.65 Thus, since the President acted with what is
considered the express authorization of Congress, the President had
maximum authority to act, and the Court will almost always uphold such
action as Constitutional.'
The Court relied upon a different theory, however, in ruling that the
President also had authority to suspend current United States court claims
against the Iranian government, and conceded that neither the IEEPA statute
nor 22 U.S.C. § 1731 (the Hostage Act) gave the President express authority
62 Id. at 667.
63 Id. at 668.
"Id. at 671 (quoting Sec. 1702 IEEPA(a)(1), "The Presidential revocation of the license
he issued permitting prejudgment restraints upon Iranian assets ... falls within the plain
language of the IEEPA. In vacating the attachments, he acted to 'nullify [and] void... any
... exercising [of] any right, power, or privilege with respect to ... any property in which
any foreign country ... has any interest. . . by any person ... subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.' ").
65 Id. at 672-73 (citing Orivis v. Brownell, 345 U.S. 183 (1953) (attachment obtained by
American claimant subject to revocable license and obtained after entry of freeze order is
subordinate to President's power under IEEPA)).
6Id. at 674 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (President's
acts here are supported by the "strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation.")).
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to act on this issue.67 However, the Court held, "[s]uch failure of Congress
specifically to delegate authority does not, 'especially ... in the area of
foreign policy and national security,' imply 'congressional disapproval' of
action taken by the Executive. ' In fact, the Court goes so far as to state
that legislation enacted which is closely related to the President's conduct,
and which gives the President wide discretion, may be considered to invite
a "measure of independent Presidential responsibility," especially where there
is a history of Congressional acquiescence for the type of conduct engaged
in by the President.69
In Dames & Moore, the Court further stated that because there existed a
long standing practice of settling claims between nations by the Executive,
because previous Supreme Court decisions had upheld this type of Presiden-
tial authority, 70 and because Congress had approved of this action,71 the
President had authority to suspend pending United States court claims even
without express Constitutional or Congressional authorization.72 The Court
justified this result by stating that there had been a "systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never
before questioned [which] may be treated as a gloss on Executive power
vested in the President by virtue of § 1 of Article 11." 7 1
Just as it did in Curtiss-Wright, the Court provided the Executive branch
with very broad, expansive powers beyond those specifically enumerated in
the Constitution, justifying this result solely by Congressional silence. This
has, in turn, created an atmosphere within the Executive branch whereby the
President is able to act unilaterally on almost any issue if he is willing to
wager that Congress will remain silent, impliedly consenting to his conduct,
and thus conferring upon him authority to act.
This is arguably a far broader power than the founders of the Constitution
intended to confer upon the President when they provided him with all of the
67 Id. at 676 (Court says language of Hostage Act is broad, but does not conclusively give
President express right to suspend court claims; legislative history for this statute refutes this
proposition as well).
6' id. at 678.
69 Id at 678 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
70 Id. at 682-83 (citing U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)).
7' Id. at 682.
7 id.
7 Id. at 686 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11). The Court relied on United
States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) stating that "[p]ast practice does not, by
itself, create power but 'long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress,
would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent."
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"executive powers."74 Nonetheless, the acquiescence theory is one of the
strongest arguments today for allowing a President to act alone in the area
of foreign affairs.
IV. ANALYSIS: ROOSEVELT, TRUMAN AND CLINTON COMPARED
Rather than solely relying upon a "history of Congressional Acquiescence"
as authority for taking blatant unilateral action, many Presidents in recent
history have decided to expand their power in a safer manner by relying on
some form of legislation-perhaps even legislation that was intended for an
entirely different purpose.75
President Roosevelt in 1933 relied upon §5(b) of the Trading With the
Enemy Actd '6 as the legislative authority giving him the power to declare a
domestic emergency and to close all of the national banks for what is now
known as the 1933 Bank Holiday. The plain language of that statute
suggests that it was never intended to be used in dealing with domestic
74 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1 ("The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (Art. II, § 1 does not grant to the President "all of the executive powers of which
the government is capable [because] the example of such unlimited executive power that must
have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the
description of his evils in the Declaration of Independence leads ... to doubt that they were
creating their new Executive in his image.").
75 Examples exist where Presidents have reinterpreted treaty provisions, such as the
Executive branch's reinterpretation of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the
United States Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, United
States-United Nations, 61 Stat. 756, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, 11 U.N.T.S. 11, which created an
international obligation "to provide permanent residence rights for a permanent observer to
the U.N." where such right did not previously exist upon Congress' approval of the
agreement. See M.A. Thomas, Comment: When the Guests Move In: Permanent Observers
to the United Nations Gain the Right to Establish Permanent Missions in the United States,
78 CALIF. L. REV. 197, 242 (1990), (this executive reinterpretation expanded U.S. obligations
under the Headquarters Agreement without Congressional authorization and contrary to
evidence of apparent Congressional intent).
Another example is seen in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992), where
the Supreme Court implicitly accepted the Executive usurpation of power in regulatory law
even where Congress had asserted a contrary intent. See George R. Rogers, Comment:
Legislative Intent vs. Executive Non-Enforcement: A New Bounty Statute as a Solution to
Executive Usurpation of Congressional Power, 69 IND. L.J. 1257, 1260 (1994).
76 War and National Defense, Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, Ch. 106, at 5(b), 40
Stat. 411 (1917) current version at 12 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 5(b) (1994) [hereinafter TWEA].
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problems, but rather was drafted as war powers legislation following World
War I and was intended to apply only to foreign transactions with no direct
domestic impact.
77
Yet, Roosevelt used the legislation as authority to act in response to a
purely domestic economic concern. He was not acting under threat of war
or due to fluctuations in foreign currency, but instead was acting in
conjunction with his concerns in taking the dollar off of the Gold Stan-
dard. 78 The reason that his conduct was not questioned or constitutionally
challenged is because Congress subsequently agreed with the result.79 "By
equating the economic debacle with war, FDR asked for and received from
Congress the resources [commensurate with] a military commander battling
a foreign invader."'
Roosevelt certainly misused this statute in order to authorize his conduct
and was technically without any power to act since no other Constitutional
or Congressional authority conferred this power on him. However, his action
was rendered constitutional for the simple reason that Congress retroactively
approved of it. Viewed in light of the Curtiss-Wright and Dames & Moore
decisions, both of which allow the President to create Constitutional power
based on the silent acquiescence of Congress, Roosevelt's action suggests
that the Executive may shift the allocation of Constitutional power contrary
' See Harold G. Maier, Immigration Emergency Powers: Legislative and Executive
Interaction and Refugee Policy on the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate hearing, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1982) [hereinafter Maier Testimony]; see also Alexewicz v. General
Aniline & Film Corp., 43 N.Y.S. 2d at 718 (1943) (court held that war powers legislation was
only concerned with regulation of foreign exchange and obviously was primarily intended to
be used as a method to prevent withdrawals of cash assets from banking institutions when
public welfare so required); see also Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. at 484 (1949) ("freezing order
issued under authority of TWEA immobilizes assets ... so that title to them might not shift
... until the government can determine whether those assets are needed for prosecution of
threatened war.").
" See Michael E. Parrish, New Deal Symposium: the Great Depression, the New Deal,
and the American Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REv. 723, 736 (1984) ("acting under dubious
authority of the [TWEA] from World War I, [President] Roosevelt banned gold exports and
all foreign exchange transactions until Congress approved the administration's monetary
schemes and devalued the dollar by almost twenty-five percent.").
7 Id.
'o Id. at 723, 725 (citing Leuchtinburg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in




to the framers' intent and in clear violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.81
While the Constitution does not expressly grant any emergency executive
authority, it is now a commonly accepted proposition that the President
should have wide discretion to deal with both domestic and foreign
emergencies.8 2 When such emergency powers are successively abused by
Presidents who seek to by-pass the Constitution and act without Congressio-
nal approval, however, this abuse of power must be curbed so that Constitu-
tional safeguards founded in a system of checks and balances are not
obliterated. 3
Roosevelt's unilateral action remains constitutional because Congress
subsequently approved of his actions. Such conduct will rarely be judicially
reviewed because the Executive and Legislative branches are said to have
acted together. However, more recent Presidents have become even bolder
than Roosevelt, and not only have relied on tenuous legislation intended for
another purpose, but have also acted without seeking or obtaining approval
from Congress altogether. This makes any Presidential argument that he is
acting with "Congressional authority" completely superficial, and certainly
calls into question the continued existence of the traditional view of the
separation of powers doctrine.
President Truman claimed legislative authority for engaging the United
States in the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
via legislation enacted in the Protocol of Provisional Application (hereinafter
"PPA") contained in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1945.84 Yet
the GATT agreement went far beyond the scope of legislative authority
relied upon by Truman, as GATT at that time consisted of approximately
45,000 tariff concessions and thirty-four articles obligating the member states
on such matters as most-favored nation treatment, nondiscrimination in
internal taxation and import restrictions which the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act never intended to address.8"
81 See supra notes 4, 6.
82 See Jules Lobel, Comment: Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1389 (1989).
"' Such measures were taken when Congress enacted IEEPA to limit the President's
authority in emergencies and are seen in Court decisions such as Youngstown.
4See John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 253 (1967) (citing 61 Stat. Pt. 6, at A2051 (1947), 55
U.N.T.S. 308 (1950), and 59 Stat. 410 (1945)).
" Id. at 256, 257.
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Several culminating factors regarding GATT demonstrate a blatant misuse
of the legislation by Truman. First, GATT is a multilateral agreement, and
the legislation authorized only bilateral agreements; second, many specific
substantive clauses, such as those mentioned regarding import taxes and
most-favored nation status, were clearly beyond the scope of the legislation's
authority; and third, GATT is actually an international organization into
which the legislation relied upon does not authorize entry.86
The plain language of the legislation states that the President may engage
in bilateral agreements regarding "foreign trade."8" Yet, many clauses exist
within the GATT which deal strictly with administrative matters such as
consultation over disputes, waivers, and amendments, as well as with non-
trade matters such as national treatment of imported goods and dumping, all
of which are beyond the scope of the statute relied upon by Truman.88
Truman's reliance upon this legislation to engage the United States in such
a broad, multilateral agreement is tenuous at best, and probably unconstitu-
tional. This is especially so since Truman could not have relied upon any
inherent Constitutional powers to act alone to the extent that GATT relates
directly to foreign commerce, the regulation of which is vested exclusively
in Congress. 9
Like Roosevelt before him, Truman relied upon legislation by claiming
that it authorized him to act unilaterally, while in fact it was never intended
to provide such authorization. In contrast to Roosevelt's Bank Holiday
action, Congress never formally approved of Truman's Executive action and
86 Id. at 257. The Legislative history of the Protocol of Provisional Application ("PPA")
statute provides neither the authority nor any suggestion of authority to enter into a
multilateral rather than a bilateral agreement. Also, the Congressional hearings records show
that members of Congress were shocked that the Executive had suggested that other countries
join in this multilateral agreement when Congress had not previously considered that as a
possibility when passing the PPA within the Trade Agreements Acts; see also Hearings on
the Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed International Trade
Organization Before the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 80th Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 1 at 6
(1947).
8 See supra note 82.
's See Jackson, supra note 84, at 362.
89 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (Congress has power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations); see also Jackson, supra note 84, at 275 ("The power to regulate foreign commerce
is vested in Congress, not the Executive; the Executive may not exercise the power by




only recently approved of GAT' itself in 1994.90 The only real argument
in favor of GATT's constitutional validity today is historical recognition by
Congress.9 The Executive branch, seeking to rely on this precedent as a
source of power in the future, has always argued for the validity of GATT.
The Judicial branch has assumed validity of GATT and relied upon its
provisions in several decisions,' while Congress has only recently recog-
nized its validity in legislation authorizing the Kennedy Round of re-
negotiations for certain GATT provisions,9a and finally in the 1994 approval
of GATT's obligations within the United States.
All of this approval has been retroactive out of necessity, and the result
of this unauthorized Presidential action has been to create an even greater
shift of power from the Legislative branch to the Executive in the areas of
international trade and foreign relations, powers which are expressly
delegated to Congress under the Constitution. This shift cannot practically
be altered today because "to disown the GATT at this point would be a jolt
to this nation's foreign policy, and, indeed, to the stability of international
economic relations throughout most of the world."94
While these specific acts by Roosevelt and Truman may, in fact, have
proven beneficial to the United States in retrospect, Congress must demand
a more active role in determining foreign affairs in the future or it risks
being forced to abdicate its power in this area to the Executive, which may
ultimately prove costly to the nation.
90 See John H. Jackson, supra note 84, at 265 (citing 8 Dept. State Bull. 970 (1945))
(According to the State Department, GAT'T "was authorized by a combination of existing
statutes and Presidential authority," and therefore there was no need to submit it to Congress).
However, neither the applicable statute nor the Constitution granted this authority to the
President, so he essentially acted unilaterally and completely without authority. The
ramifications of allowing this to continue present a startling disregard for the Framers'
intentions in creating the separation of powers.
9' Id. at 260.
92 Id. at 269-70 nn.108-09 (citing Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Superior Court, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 803 (1962), where California "Buy American Act" was held unenforceable because
violative of GATT); see also Territory v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957) (court struck down
territorial law as contrary to GATT and unconstitutional).
93 See Jackson, supra note 84, at 260.
" Id. at 260. It is likely that if the Courts in the U.S. were to even hear a case regarding
the validity of the GATI it would be upheld based on subsequent Congressional acquies-
cence, even though informal. Likewise, it would be virtually impossible to terminate § 5(b)
of the TWEA because the government has come to rely upon this delegation of legislative
power to the point that terminating this statute would "seriously injure the governmental
process." See also Maier Testimony, supra note 77 (regarding § 5(b) of TWEA).
1996]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The most recent example of executive unilateral action justified superfi-
cially by unrelated legislation is President Clinton's direct $20 billion loan
initiative to Mexico, which was proffered to stabilize the Mexican peso.
This initiative was based on legislation intended only to stabilize the United
States dollar.
On January 31, 1995, President Clinton issued a "Statement with
Congressional Leaders on Financial Assistance to Mexico" stating that
because of the "emergency circumstances" in Mexico he intended to rely on
the Exchange Stabilization Fund95 (ESF) to provide billions of dollars in
financial assistance to Mexico." The ESF was established in 1934 with $2
billion and was intended to be used to "defend the dollar after the United
States abandoned the gold standard." 9 Today, the fund has grown to an
amount between $25 and $30 billion, and its function is still to make "short
term adjustments" of currency.9"
The plain language of the statute states that the Department of the
Treasury administers the fund, which is "available to carry out this section,
* . .(22 U.S.C. § 286e-3), and § 3 of the Special Drawing Rights Act of the
IMF, 22 U.S.C. § 286(o)."99 The words "this section" refer to the ability
of the Secretary of the Treasury, with approval from the President, to "deal
in gold, foreign exchange, and other instruments of credit and securities that
the Secretary considers necessary" to effectuate an "orderly exchange
arrangement and a stable system of exchange rates." l
Unlike the IEEPA statute relied upon by President Carter in Dames &
Moore, the legislative history behind the ESF does not grant the President
broad authority to act in administering loans to support the value of foreign
currency.' ' The majority of members in Congress today interpret the ESF
" See 31 U.S.C. § 5302 (1994).
6 See "President's Statement With Congressional Leaders on Financial Assistance to
Mexico," 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., 155 (Jan. 31, 1995), cited in 105 YALE L.J. 1311,
1312 n.9 (1996).
97 See Ducan Hunter, Clinton's Solo Bailout Spells Disaster, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995,
at B7; see also U.S. Treasury Chief Urges Support for Mexico Pact, REUTERS FINANCIAL
SERvIcE, Mar. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNEWS file (Senate Banking
Comm. Chairman Alfonse D'Amato said, "This fund was intended to stabilize the dollar, not
the peso.").
9 141 CONG. REc. S4046 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1995); see also Hunter, supra note 97.
99 See 31 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1) (1994) (Stabilization Exchange Rates and Arrangements).
100 31 U.S.C. § 5302(b) (1994).
1o1 See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
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as providing for "orderly exchange arrangements" needed to stabilize the
U.S. dollar, which was not in need of stabilization at the time the loans were
made to Mexico."°2 The language of the statute also states that any action
taken under the law must be "consistent with the U.S. government's
obligations under the IMF, which expressly provides for the necessity of
Congressional approval in most areas.'0 3 The ESF is expressly reserved
for the transfer of funds, in the form of United States purchases of currencies
or gold from the IMF, to the ESF in order to stabilize the dollar." 4 In
addition, the ESF was designed to repay funds withdrawn from the IMF
pursuant to §286(o) of the IMF."°
The records of the Congressional hearings regarding this statute suggest
that the President's use of the ESF is legally tenuous, and that the statute
itself may be unconstitutional if it may be interpreted to allow the President
to appropriate funds in this way.10
'02 See 141 CONG. REC. S4046, 4047, (Senator Brown, "If there is a purpose for the
Exchange Stabilization Fund, it surely must be to defend the United States dollar.").
Although a provision in § 5203(b) states that loans to a foreign government may be made for
more than six months in an "emergency," these were intended to be made only in a U.S.
emergency in an effort to stabilize the U.S. dollar against a foreign currency, and not vice
versa.
103 See sources cited supra note 97; see also 22 U.S.C. § 286 (Congress authorized the
President to accept membership in the Fund); see also 22 U.S.C. § 286(a) (President may
appoint governor of the Fund with advice and consent of Senate); see also § 286(b)(1)
(Providing for Annual Reports to Congress); see also § 286(c) (Congressional authorization
needed for certain actions including (1) change in quota of the U.S. under the Fund, (2)
proposing a par value for the U.S. dollar, (3) proposing a change in par value, (4) the U.S.
subscribing to additional shares of stock, (5) accepting an Amendment to the Fund agreement,
(6) making any loan to the fund, (7) making any approval of disposition of more than $25
million ounces of Fund gold for the benefit of the Trust Fund or establishing any additional
trust fund, and (8) consent to any borrowing by the Fund).
104 See 22 U.S.C. § 286(e-3) (1994).
105 Id.; see also 22 U.S.C. § 286(o) (1994); see also 22 U.S.C. § 286(o)(a) ("Special
Drawing Rights allocated to the United States ... shall be deposited in the Exchange
Stabilization Fund account"); see also 22 U.S.C. § 286(o)(b) ("currency payments by the U.S.
in return for Special Drawing Rights ... shall be made from the resources of the ESF.").
10' See 141 CONG. REC. H 1298, 1299, 104th Cong. 1st Sess., Feb. 7, 1995 ("Obviously,
31 U.S.C. § 5302 is unconstitutional because it allows the Executive branch to exercise
powers exclusively given to Congress in the Constitution."); see also U.S. CONST., art. I, §
9 ("No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made
by law."); see also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (gives Congress the exclusive authority to "coin
money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins").
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Should Congress decide to bring suit, perhaps the Court may consider the
question of whether the ESF statute, like the statute at issue in Curtiss-
Wright, creates an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
President."° If the Court were to consider this issue it would likely find
that the delegation of power is, in fact, unconstitutional, and that the entire
ESF must be abandoned or redrafted to require Congressional authorization
regarding the valuation of either the United States dollar or foreign currency
as is expressly stated in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. However, even
if the statute itself were to be deemed valid, the fundamental question
remaining is whether the President's conduct in this instance was authorized
by Congress pursuant to the ESF, or whether Congress' intent in enacting the
statute was solely to provide for the stabilization of the dollar, thus making
President Clinton's act unauthorized and unconstitutional. Congress has
recently taken steps to prevent the Executive from using the ESF for such
foreign loans in the future.'
If Congress does not seek judicial review of Clinton's action, and even if
it never formally approves of Clinton's conduct, future Presidents will be
able to rely on the same authority. Similar Executive action will then
automatically be deemed constitutional based on the theory that a history of
Congressional silence amounts to acquiescence as seen in Curtiss-Wright, in
the dictum of Youngstown Sheet & Tube, and in Dames & Moore.109
Thus, there seems to be no end to the unfettered discretion of the President
to act unilaterally in foreign affairs so long as any legislation remotely
related to his conduct exists and is relied upon. Perhaps then, the time is
ripe for a new Court ruling defining more accurately the role of the
Executive when acting alone in foreign affairs. An even more appropriate
response would be for the Court to put an end to the "implied Congressional
authority" theory based on a history of silent acquiescence, in order to ensure
that the Framers' intentions regarding the separation of powers are respected.
10 See sources cited supra note 27.
'o8 Senate OK's Measure That Would Restrict White House Use of ESF, Banking Rep.
(BNA), Vol. 65, No. 7, p. 318 (Aug. 14, 1995) (Measure approved that would restrict White
House's use of ESF to make loans to other countries in future without Congressional -
approval). However, without judicial intervention in the form of lawsuit and judgment, future
Presidents will still be able to take similar action and rely on a statute which was not intended
to be used in the specified way based on the silent acquiescence theory.




These three examples of unilateral, executive action have been deemed
valid and remain constitutional because their effects have become so
entrenched in our nation's political, economic and social affairs that to
attempt to repeal them after the fact is almost impossible. It has been argued
that what Justice Jackson meant when writing about the maximum authority
of the President to act in light of Congressional authorization was that so
long as the governmental branches agree that a specific act is valid (even if
that agreement is procured retroactively) then the practice is "functionally
constitutional" regardless of the Framers' intent or the words of the
document." 0
However, this argument only holds true if, in fact, all three branches
actually agree that the act is valid. In the three examples presented here, the
Legislative branch never intended to authorize the acts of the Executive
beforehand, and actually refused to approve of the acts in two cases after the
fact. The argument that the passage of time creates authorization should not
be given enough credence to allow a constitutional shift in power never
intended by the framers, and never actually consented to by the coordinate
branches of government.
Although the definition of a "constitutional" act evolves over time, and is
shaped by the historical practices of all three branches of government,
conduct which is clearly contrary to the express words of the Constitution
should not be deemed constitutionally valid simply because one branch of
government has the means to exercise such conduct, and the others remain
silent over a period of time. The system of checks and balances within the
Constitution was intended to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
in one branch of government, and Congress must assert its check now to
prevent further loss of power in the area of foreign affairs in the future.
"o See Maier testimony, supra note 77.
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